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Out of the Shadows: The Positive Impact of
Lawrence v. Texas on Victims of Same-Sex
Domestic Violence
Tara R. Pfeifer*
I called [the Kansas City Anti-Violence Project] after my partner
Clay attacked me twice. I had only known Clay for two months
when his behavior became very erratic. He attacked me and broke
several bones including my collar bone. When I called the police,
they said it was a sex thing and laughed at me. They wouldn't arrest
Clay even though I had to go to the emergency room for my
injuries....
-Bennie

I.

1

Introduction

"The bottom line is that homosexuals tend to shut up about
domestic violence.",2 Following the murder of a lesbian by her live-in
lover, a gay rights advocate commented on the reluctance of victims of

* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2005; B.A. History, cum laude, The College of William and Mary, 2000. The
author wishes to thank Professor Carlos A. Ball for his thoughtful suggestions. The
author also wishes to thank her family for their love and support.
1. NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL
AND TRANSGENDER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: 2003 SUPPLEMENT (2004), available at

http://www.avp.org/publications/reports/2003NCAVPdvrpt.pdf (last visited February 3,
2005) [hereinafter 2003 SUPPLEMENT].
The National Coalition of Anti-Violence
Programs noted that the 2003 supplement is to serve as an "update" to the 2001 and 2002
editions, which contained definitions, policies, theories and an extensive survey of civil
protective orders, because as of October 2004, "nothing appreciable about this
information had changed." Id. at 2. Much of the data and statistics in this comment are
derived from the 2001 and 2002 reports and are cited accordingly.

2. Rosemary Barnes, When Secrecy Is Deadly: Experts Say Gays, Lesbians Fear
Being 'Outed' If They Report Battering,SAN-ANTONIO ExPRESS NEWS, May 17, 2003, at
1B (quoting Graciela Sanchez, executive director of the Esperanza Peace and Justice
Center in San Antonio, Texas).
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same-sex domestic violence to report incidents of abuse.3 Her statement
reflects the harsh reality confronted by victims of domestic violence
within the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered ("GLBT")
community and the tragic consequences resulting from the disparate
protection afforded to these victims.
In October of 2004, the National Coalition of Anti-Violence
Programs 4 ("NCAVP") released its most recent statistics on the
prevalence of same-sex domestic violence. 5 The participating NCAVP
member organizations documented a record 6,523 same-sex domestic
violence incidents in 2003.6 This total represented a 13% increase in the
number of cases reported by the same agencies in 2002,
and included six
7
reported same-sex domestic violence-related deaths.
3. Id. Ms. Sanchez explained that many gays and lesbians in San Antonio feared
the insensitivity of law enforcement officers and mistrusted mainstream domestic
violence centers. Id.
4. See generally NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, available at
http://www.ncavp.org/ (last visited February 3, 2005). NCAVP is a coalition of lesbian,
gay, bisexual, and transgender victim advocacy and documentation programs located
throughout the United States. See THE NEW YORK CITY GAY & LESBIAN ANTI-VIOLENCE
PROJECT, NCAVP/Members, available at http://www.avp.org/ncavp.htm (last visited
February 3, 2005). Before officially forming in 1995, NCAVP member organizations
worked with the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force for over a decade to forge a
coordinated response to violence against the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
community. Id. Initially, member organizations focused on promoting public education
about bias-motivated crimes against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender people. Id.
However, "[a]s the prevalence of domestic violence in [the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender] community has emerged from the shadows, NCAVP member organizations
have increasingly adapted their missions and their services to respond to violence within
the community as well." Id. NCAVP issued its first annual domestic violence report in
October of 1997. Id. NCAVP won a recent victory in its war against same-sex domestic
violence when U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer (New York) announced that the New
York-based Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project, a member of NCAVP, would
receive $225,000 from the Department of Justice. Schumer Announces $225,000 for New
York Gay and Lesbian Anti-Violence Project, STATES NEWS SERVICE, January 27, 2005,
availableat 2005 WL 60514427. The funds will be used to "[improve] the awareness of,
service to and policy around lesbian, gay, transgender, bisexual, and HIV-affected
individuals who are domestic violence and sexual assault survivors." Id.
5. The report contains the number of domestic violence incidents recorded in 2003
by twelve NCAVP member agencies and several affiliates. 2003 SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 1, at 1-2. NCAVP acknowledged the limitations of the document because of the
varying organizational structures and program capacities of the reporting agencies, as
well as the different collecting and reporting instruments employed. Id. Accordingly,
NCAVP carefully noted that the supplement "does not present a comprehensive survey of
[lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender] domestic violence in the U.S." Id.
6. 2003 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1,at 3.
7. 2003 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 3. In 2002, NCAVP member agencies
reported 5,718 cases of same-sex domestic violence. Id. NCAVP stated that a significant
increase in reported incidents stemmed from Los Angeles, California. Id. NCAVP
attributed this increase to the presence of a large and well-established NCAVP member
agency in Los Angeles and extensive support provided by that city's law enforcement
departments. Id. Other large cities, such as Boston and New York, also reported
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The NCAVP study demonstrated that same-sex domestic violence
cut across gender and racial lines. Of the 6,523 cases reported in 2003,
44% of the victims identified as male, 36% identified as female, 2%
identified as transgender and the remaining victims did not self-identify.
Although member agencies reported the race/ethnicity of victims in only
42% of cases, those numbers indicated that 44% where white, 25% were
Latino, 15% were of African descent, 5% were Asian/Pacific Islander,
and 4% were multi-racial. 9
These statistics reveal that same-sex domestic violence continues to
be a significant problem in the United States. In fact, same-sex domestic
violence is believed to occur at a rate equal to heterosexual domestic
violence, estimated in 25-33 percent of relationships.1 0 Some experts
have even speculated that gay men's domestic violence occurs more
frequently than heterosexual domestic violence."
Yet, despite the
prevalence of same-sex domestic violence, the issue has traditionally
been plagued by invisibility and lack of societal awareness."
In addition to facing societal invisibility, victims of same-sex
domestic violence also encounter obstacles in the legal system. In 2001,
NCAVP provided a state-by-state survey of the legal protections
available to victims of same-sex domestic violence. 13 NCAVP reported
meaningful growth in the number of reported incidents. Id. at 4. Incidents reported in
smaller cities either remained the same or slightly decreased. Id.
8. 2003 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 7.
9. 2003 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 1, at 10.
10. Sharon Cammack & Patrice Pujol, Domestic Violence: A National Epidemic,
HOUSTON LAWYER, September/October 2004, at 13 ("Domestic violence among same-sex
couples occurs with the same statistical frequency as those found among heterosexual
couples."). See also John Leland, Silence Ending About Abuse in Gay Relationships,
N.Y. TIMES, November 6, 2000, at A18; Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence:
Claiming A Domestic Sphere While Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTs. L. REV. 325, 329-31 (Spring 1999); NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE
PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN2002: A
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS (2003), available at

http://www.avp.org/publications/reports/2002NCAVPdvrpt.pdf
at 7-9 (last visited
February 3, 2005) [hereinafter 2002 REPORT].
11. Marc Spindelman, Surviving Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1615, 1635
n.99 (June 2004) (citing DAVID ISLAND & PATRICK LETELLIER, MEN WHO BEAT THE MEN
WHO LOVE THEM: BATTERED GAY MEN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 14 (1991)).
12. See, e.g., Kathleen Finley Duthu, Why Doesn't Anyone Talk About Gay and
Lesbian Domestic Violence?, 18 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 23, 24-25 (Spring 1996) ("Most
people are unaware that domestic violence exists in gay and lesbian relationships....
Domestic violence is generally referred to synonymously as spousal abuse or wife abuse
and victims are often called battered wives or battered women. These types of references
have placed the focus of domestic violence on heterosexual marital relationships, and
inaccurately imply that domestic violence does not apply to gay and lesbian
relationships.").
13. NAT'L COALITION OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND
TRANSGENDER DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN 2001: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COALITION OF
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that some states had legal remedies that explicitly excluded victims of
same-sex domestic violence from civil protection.1 4 Other state domestic
violence statutes contained ambiguous language that, when coupled with
state anti-sodomy statutes or conservative judicial interpretations, barred
gay and lesbian victims
of domestic violence from protective orders
5
against their abusers. 1
It is difficult to say how much progress, if any, would be made in
affirmatively extending legal protection to victims of same-sex domestic
violence if this were left entirely up to the state legislative process.
Fortunately, this inquiry need only remain a rhetorical one because the
recent United States Supreme Court decision of Lawrence v. Texas 16 will
have a significant positive impact on the resources and legal protections
available to victims of same-sex domestic violence.
This comment will explore the direct and indirect effects that the
Lawrence decision will have on same-sex domestic violence. Part II of
this comment provides a background on same-sex domestic violence,
including the special issues faced by GLBT victims of domestic violence
and the current availability of civil protective orders for victims of samesex domestic violence. This section also describes the effect of the U.S.
Supreme Court decision of Bowers v. Hardwick17 and state anti-sodomy
laws on the recognition and prevention of same-sex domestic violence.
Part III analyzes the implications of the Lawrence decision on same-sex
domestic violence. Subpart A summarizes the Lawrence decision itself,
exploring the majority's analysis and the overruling of the Bowers
decision. Subpart B focuses on the effect of Lawrence's invalidation of
state anti-sodomy laws on same-sex domestic violence. Finally, Subpart
C postulates that by paving the way for same-sex marriage, Lawrence
will lead to equal access to civil protective orders for victims of same-sex
domestic violence.
II.
A.

Background
Special Issues in Same-Sex Domestic Violence

Domestic violence is defined as a "pattern of behaviors utilized by
one partner (the abuser or batterer) to exert and maintain control over
another person (the survivor or victim) where there exists an intimate,
ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS 47-67 (2002), available at http://www.avp.org/publications/
reports/200 1NCAVPdvrpt.pdf (last visited February 3, 2005) [hereinafter 2001 REPORT].

14. Id. at 13.
15. Id. at 13-16.
16. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
17. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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loving and dependent relationship." '1 8 Although this neutral definition
literally encompasses both heterosexual and homosexual relationships,
victims of same-sex domestic violence often encounter obstacles not
faced by their heterosexual counterparts.
Many victims of same-sex domestic violence fear that reporting
their abuse will elicit homophobic or inadequate responses from the
police and the court system. 19 One lesbian recalled that when police
responded to her report of domestic violence, they exclaimed that they
"don't understand lesbian relationships" and told her abuser to take a
"cool-down walk., 20 Victims have also encountered ridicule and
homophobic remarks by attorneys and court personnel, causing their
experience in the court system to be a humiliating nightmare.2
Oftentimes domestic violence shelter programs and workers are
unprepared and ill-equipped to handle cases of same-sex domestic
violence.22 Domestic violence shelters have been "slow and late" in
providing services to battered gays and lesbians, with many shelters
refusing to admit GLBT victims or expressing homophobic attitudes
when those individuals do elicit support. 23 A lesbian victim of domestic
violence in Minnesota reported that she felt like an "outcast" at her local
domestic violence
shelter, often hearing anti-gay remarks being made by
24
victims.
fellow
Reporting their abusive partners forces closeted gay and lesbian
victims to "out" themselves, a significant decision that may adversely
affect other important aspects of the victim's life.2 5 The homophobia of
18. 2002 REPORT, supra note 10, at 5.
19. Id. at 14-15. See also Pam Elliott, Shattering Illusions: Same-Sex Domestic
Violence, in VIOLENCE IN GAY AND LESBIAN DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS 1 (Claire M.

Renzetti and Charles Harvey Miley, eds., 1996).
20. 2002 REPORT, supra note 10, at 16. See also Leland, supra note 10, at A18 (A
lesbian victim of abuse described a police response to her injuries as: "Tomorrow you
will kiss and make up.").
21. See Sandra E. Lundy, Abuse That Dare Not Speak Its Name: Assisting Victims of
Lesbian and Gay Domestic Violence in Massachusetts, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 273, 290-91

(Winter 1993).
22. 2002 REPORT, supra note 10, at 17 (describing the inability of many domestic
violence shelters and agencies to serve the needs of GLBT victims of domestic violence).
See also Lisa Marie Gomez, Abused gay partnerscan now turn to counseling program;
Oftentimes, gays and lesbians don't feel comfortable going to police, other social
services, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, October 24, 2004, at 1B.

23. See Lundy, supra note 21, at 287-89.
24. 2002 REPORT, supra note 10, at 14-15.
25. Id. at 18. See also Duthu, supra note 12, at 31-32 (Spring 1996); see Knauer,
supra note 10, at 337. "Homophobia in the United States often prompts (or forces)
individuals in same-sex relationships to conceal their relationship or at least the sex of the
partner. This concealment requires extraordinary skills in information management
because the extent to which an individual chooses to be 'out' may vary greatly in
different aspects of her life." Id.
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society and victim apprehension about revealing his or her sexual
orientation provides batterers with the reassurance that their abuse will
continue in secrecy.26
Another special issue in same-sex domestic violence is the difficulty
of identifying the abuser and the presumption of mutual battering.27 A
batterer can use the improper screening techniques at domestic violence
shelters to gain access to the shelter or to a support group, threatening the
safety of his or her victim. 28 Furthermore, because of misconceptions
surrounding the gender dynamics of domestic violence, law enforcement
officials, service providers, and court officials assume that mutual
9
abuse/battering exists between same-sex individuals in a relationship.
Even the gay community has been reluctant to confront the
problem. Members of the community are often afraid that recognition of
same-sex domestic violence will provide right-wing conservatives with
ammunition to counter the community's political progress and damage
the image of positive, egalitarian gay and lesbian relationships.30 One
same-sex domestic violence victims' advocate commented that members
of the gay community "don't like to air our dirty laundry. People don't
like to admit, especially women in this community that this is going on.
We live with the myth that women are not violent towards other
26. Duthu, supra note 12, at 31-32.
27. 2002 REPORT, supra note 10, at 10-12. See, e.g., 2003 SUPPLEMENT, supra note
1, at 16-17 (Lynn, a lesbian, recalled her experience with police after being abused by her
partner who called the police to pose as a victim before Lynn could; after pleading with
the police offers to help her and showing her injuries, the officers informed Lynn that her
partner had called first "and that there was nothing they could do.").
28. 2002 REPORT, supra note 10, at 10. The report explained that because many
domestic violence program employees and volunteers are not trained to handle same-sex
domestic violence situations, they often offer services only to the "first caller" and deny
services to the subsequent caller from the same relationship. Id. Moreover, a batterer,
(especially a female one) can take advantage of improper screening to gain access to a
domestic violence shelter or support group by posing as a victim of another abusive
relationship or of an abusive heterosexual relationship. Id. "[W]ithout proper screening,
mainstream [domestic violence] programs can't be appropriately equipped to provide
safety to LGBT people and arguably place all their clients in danger by leaving open the
possibility of admitting a batterer for services or shelter." Id.
29. 2002 REPORT, supra note 10, at 11-12.
30. Knauer, supra note 10, at 331. See Peter Sprigg, Pressing 'Domestic Unions,'
THE WASH. TIMES, August 25, 2002, at B5. Mr. Sprigg, Director of Culture Studies at the
highly-conservative Family Research Council, wrote an editorial comparing heterosexual
and homosexual unions. He opposed the recognition of same-sex civil unions and
marriage, arguing "that homosexuals have higher rates of physical disease, mental illness,
substance abuse, and, according to some sources, domestic violence as well. There is
little evidence that 'committed' same-sex unions mitigate those risks significantly, if at
all." Id. See also Sharon Terlep, Order Bans Gay Co-Adoptions, LANSING STATE J., June
6, 2002, at IA (quoting Gary Glenn, president of the American Family Association, as
saying a judge's decision to halt the practice of gay adoption "prevents the state from
giving its seal of approval to adoption situations that put children at risk").
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31

Availability of Protective Ordersfor Victims of Same-Sex Domestic
Violence
According to domestic violence workers, "an order of protection is

one of the most important tools in attempting to protect a survivor from
further abuse.

32

These orders prohibit the abuser from abusing and/or

harassing his or her victim, provide the victim with a wide-range of
remedies and impose significant penalties on the abuser for violations of
the order.33
The NCAVP's 2001 report summarized the protection orders

available to same-sex victims of domestic violence on a state-by-state
basis.34 In this report, the NCAVP grouped the fifty states' domestic
violence protective orders into four categories.3 5 This comment uses the
NCAVP 2001 report as a starting point in providing a brief summary of

the current status of legal protections available to victims of same-sex
domestic violence.
Several states prevent victims of same-sex domestic violence from
accessing protective orders.36

Delaware,37 Montana,3 8 New York,39

31. Annie Sweeney, Violence in Same-Sex Relationships Often is Secret Due to
Stigma, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, October 28, 2002, at 19 (quoting Lisa Tonna, Director of
Advocacy Legislative Affairs at Horizons Community Services in Chicago, Illinois); see
also Leland, supra note 10, at A18 (quoting a domestic violence worker at a gay and
lesbian clinic as stating "People feel, 'Why should we air out our dirty laundry? People
feel so negatively about us already, the last thing we should do is contribute to negative
stereotypes of us."').
32. 2001 REPORT, supra note 13, at 13.
33. See Pamela M. Jablow, Victims of Abuse and Discrimination: Protecting
Battered Homosexuals Under Domestic Violence Legislation, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095,
1111-12 (Summer 2000).
34. 2001 REPORT, supra note 13, at 47-67.
35. Id. at 13. The NCAVP categorized the state statutes as: protective orders that are
clearly unavailable to survivors of same-sex domestic violence; protective orders that are
arguably unavailable to survivors of same-sex domestic violence; protective orders that
are neutrally available to survivors of same-sex domestic violence; and protective orders
that are affirmatively available to survivors of same-sex domestic violence. Id. In its
2001 report, the NCAVP included only Florida in its "arguably unavailable" category.
Id. at 14. However, a recent Florida court decision places Florida among the jurisdictions
that make domestic violence protection clearly available to victims of same-sex domestic
violence. See infra notes 69-72 and accompanying text. Consequently, I do not refer to
an "arguably unavailable" category in this comment.
36. 2001 REPORT, supra note 13, at 13-14.
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041 (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation). In order
to petition for a Protection from Abuse Order, a victim of domestic violence must be a
member of a "protected class." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041(3)(a) (WESTLAW
through 2004 legislation). A "protected class" is then defined as a "family member" or
"[flormer spouses, a man and a woman co-habitating together with or without a child of
either or both, or a man and a woman living separate and apart with a child in common."
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South Carolina, 40 and Virginia 4 1 currently have statutes that make
protective orders unavailable to victims of same-sex domestic violence.
These statutes make protective orders unavailable to victims of same-sex
domestic abuse by narrowly defining the class of people who can obtain
a protective order and excluding individuals within same-sex
relationships from that definition.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041(2)(b) (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation). The state
further excludes victims of same-sex domestic violence by defining "family member" as
"husband and wife; a man and woman cohabiting in a home in which there is a child of
either or both; custodian and child; or any group of persons related by blood or marriage
who are residing in one home under one head or where one is related to the other by any
of the following degrees of relationship, both parties being residents of this State." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(9) (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation).
38. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206 (WESTLAW through 2003 legislation).
Montana's domestic violence statute broadly extends protection to the partners and
family members of the abuser. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(1) (WESTLAW through
2003 legislation). Yet, the legislature prevents victims of same-sex domestic violence
from eligibility by narrowly defining these two classes. A "family member" means
"mothers, fathers, children, brothers, sisters, and other past or present family members of
a household.
These relationships include relationships created by adoption and
remarriage, including stepchildren, stepparents, in-laws, and adoptive children and
parents." MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(2)(a) (WESTLAW through 2003 legislation).
"Partners" means "spouses, former spouses, persons who have a child in common, and
persons who have been or are currently in a dating or ongoing intimate relationship with
a person of the opposite sex." MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206(2)(b) (WESTLAW through
2003 legislation).
39. The New York Family Court has the ability to grant both temporary/emergency
orders of protection from abuse and longer-term protection orders. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§§ 828, 842 (McKinney, WESTLAW through 2004 legislation). However, the court has
jurisdiction to grant such orders only for persons related by consanguinity or affinity,
persons legally married to one another, persons formally married to one another, and
persons who have a child in common regardless whether such persons have been married
or have lived together at any time. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1) (McKinney, WESTLAW
through 2004 legislation).
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20 (LEXIS through 2003 legislation). The state's
Protection From Domestic Abuse statute protects a "family or household member" of the
abuser, but adds that "family or household member" means "spouses, former spouses,
persons who have a child in common, and a male and female who are cohabiting or
formerly have cohabited." S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-20(b) (Law Co-op., WESTLAW
through 2004 legislation).
41. A court may issue an order to protect a family or household member of an
abuser. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1 (A) (Michie, WESTLAW through 2004 legislation).
But the Code further defines "family or household member" to be a spouse, former
spouse, immediate family or in-laws, any individual who has a child in common with the
alleged abuser and any individual who "cohabits" with the alleged abuser. VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-228 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2004 legislation). In 1994, the Attorney
General issued an opinion that "cohabiting" individual includes only unrelated persons of
the opposite sex living in the same household as husband and wife. 1994 Va. Op. Atty.
Gen. 60, July 22, 1994, at *2 (1994). The Attorney General added that "[i]f the General
Assembly had intended those statutory definitions to encompass unrelated persons of the
same sex, either in a homosexual relationship or merely as lodgers sharing a common
dwelling, in my opinion, it would have used a broader term .. " Id.
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The New York assembly is currently considering a bill that would
expand the definition of individuals who may obtain a protection order
from domestic abuse.42 Likewise, in February of 2003, Montana
legislator Jeff Mangan proffered a draft bill that makes the state's
domestic violence law more accessible to victims of same-sex domestic
violence.43
The vast majority of states have protective orders that are neutrally
available to victims of both opposite-sex and same-sex domestic
violence. 44 In these states, survivors of same-sex abuse should be able to
42. NY A.B. 2235, 226th Ann. Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003) (WESTLAW through 2004
legislation). The proposed bill modifies the current definition of members of the same
family or household for purposes of issuance of orders of protection from abuse. Id.
Specifically, the bill expands § 812(1) of the Family Court Act by defining "members of
the same family or household" as: "a) persons related by consanguinity or affinity;
(b) persons legally married to one another; (c) persons formerly married to one another
regardless of whether they still reside in the same household; (d) persons who have a
child in common regardless whether such persons have been married or have lived
together at any time; (e) unrelated persons who are continually or at regular intervals
living in the same household or who have in the past continually or at regular intervals
lived in the same household." Id. (emphasis added).
43. MT M.D. 2059, 58th Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2003). The bill proposes to delete the
phrase "with a person of the opposite sex," which currently modifies "dating or ongoing
intimate relationship." Id. See supra, note 38.
44. ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.66.990 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3601
(WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (Michie,
WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (West, WESTLAW
through 2005 legislation); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101 (WESTLAW through 2004
legislation); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38a (WESTLAW through 2005 legislation); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-1001 (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); FLA. STAT. ch. 741.28
(WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-1 (WESTLAW through
2004 legislation); IDAHO CODE § 39-6303 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2004
legislation); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-2-34.5 (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation);
IOWA CODE § 236.2 (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3102
(WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4002
(WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-501
(WESTLAW through 2005 legislation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 1 (WESTLAW
through 2004 legislation); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950 (West, WESTLAW
through 2004 legislation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.01 (West, WESTLAW through
2004 legislation); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-3 (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 455.010 (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-903 (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 33.018 (Michie,
WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:1 (WESTLAW
through 2004 legislation); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (Michie, WESTLAW through
2004 legislation); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-01 (WESTLAW through 2003 legislation);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.1 (West, WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); OR. REV.
STAT. § 107.705 (WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-8.1-1
(WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-10-1 (Michie,
WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-601 (WESTLAW
through 2004 legislation); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 71.0021, 71.004, 71.005 (Vernon,
WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-1 (WESTLAW through
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secure a protective order against their abusers because these laws are
written in gender-neutral language.45
For example, Alabama extends protection to victims who are
"present or former household members" of the abuser's household,
regardless of the nature of the relationship between the abuser and his or
her victim.

46

Likewise, Colorado extends domestic violence protection

to victims with whom the batterer "is living or has lived in the same
domicile" or with whom the batterer is "involved or has been involved in
an intimate relationship., 47 Neither state limits the definition of
individuals who fall under the scope of protection by requiring an
opposite-sex or marital relationship.
The District of Columbia's domestic violence statute makes a
protective order available to family members, including an individual
who "shares or who has shared a mutual residence" or "maintains or
maintained a romantic relationship not necessarily including a sexual
relationship" with the abuser.4 8 Similarly, New Mexico protects victims
who are "household members" of the abuser, including spouses, family
members, and individuals "with whom the petitioner has had a
continuing personal relationship. '49 These state statutes provide just a
few examples of laws that, by virtue of their neutral language, make civil
protective orders equally accessible to both opposite-sex and same-sex
victims of domestic violence.
In its 2001 statutory analysis, the NCAVP included Louisiana
among the states that had a domestic violence law "clearly unavailable"
to individuals in same-sex relationships.5 °
Currently, the state's
Domestic Abuse Assistance statute does exclude victims of same-sex
domestic violence.51
2004 legislation); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1101 (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010 (WESTLAW through 2005 legislation); W.VA.
CODE ANN. § 48-27-204 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2004 legislation); WIs. STAT.
ANN. §§ 46.95, 813.12 (West, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 35-21-102 (Michie, WESTLAW through 2004 legislation). See also 2001 REPORT,
supra note 13, at 15-16.
45. 2001 REPORT, supra note 13, at 15-16.
46. ALA. CODE § 30-5-2(a)(4) (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation).
47. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-14-101(2) (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation).
48. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001(5)(a)(b) (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation).
49. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2(D) (Michie, WESTLAW through 2004 legislation).
50. 2001 REPORT, supra note 13, at 15-16.
51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132 (West, WESTLAW through 2004 legislation).
Louisiana defines domestic abuse as "physical or sexual abuse and any offense against
the person as defined in the Criminal Code of Louisiana... committed by one family or
household member against another."
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132(3) (West,
WESTLAW through 2004 legislation). In the next section, the legislature defines
"family member" as "spouses, former spouses, parents and children, stepparents,
stepchildren, foster parents, and foster children" and "household members" as "any
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However, GLBT individuals in Louisiana now have an alternative
Under Louisiana's "Protection from Dating
source of protection.
Violence Act," a victim of a dating partner is eligible for the same
services, benefits, and assistance as victims under the domestic violence
statute.52 The definition of "dating partner '5 3 contains neutral language
inclusive of GLBT individuals.5 4
North Carolina's domestic violence law technically provides neutral
coverage for victims of both opposite-sex and same-sex domestic
The statute protects those individuals in a "personal
violence.
relationship" with the abuser, including "current or former household
members. 55 However, a subsequent section of the statute provides that a
domestic violence protective order shall not be a defense to individuals
charged with offenses against "public morals, 56 including sodomy.57 As
a result, gay and lesbian individuals seeking domestic violence protection
made themselves legally vulnerable to prosecution for sodomy,
significantly deterring reports of such abuse.58
person of the opposite sex presently or formerly living in the same residence with the
defendant as a spouse, whether married or not, who is seeking protection under this Part."
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2132(4) (West, WESTLAW through 2004 legislation).
52. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2151(A) (West, WESTLAW through 2004
legislation).
53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:2151(B) (West, WESTLAW through 2004
legislation). "Dating partner" is defined as "any person who is or has been in a social
relationship of a romantic or intimate nature with the victim" and where a relationships is
determined by factors such as length of the relationships, type of relationship and
frequency of interaction between the individuals. Id.
54. See People for the American Way, Louisiana-Hostile Climate: Domestic
Violence Law Covers Same-Sex Dating Partners, Civil Rights and Equal Rights, at
http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=3440 (last visited February 3, 2005)
(reporting opposition to the Protection from Dating Violence Act from right-wing groups
and politicians because it covers homosexual relationships).
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-1(b)(5) (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation).
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-8 (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation).
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation). In 1964, the
North Carolina Supreme Court explained, "[i]n this jurisdiction crime against nature
embraces sodomy, buggery and bestiality as those offenses were known and defined at
common law." State v. O'Keefe, 138 S.E.2d 767, 768 (N.C. 1964). Two years later, the
same court addressed the legislative purpose of § 14-177: "It is manifest that the
legislative intent and purpose of G.S. § 14-177 prior to the 1965 amendment and since
[the amendment provided that if a person committed a crime against nature with mankind
or beast, that individual shall be guilty of a felony and will be fined or imprisoned per the
discretion of the court] is to punish persons who undertake by unnatural and indecent
methods to gratify a perverted and depraved sexual instinct which is an offense against
public decency and morality." State v. Stubbs, 145 S.E.2d 899, 902 (N.C. 1966).
58. 2002 REPORT, supra note 10, at 19. See also Patricia G. Barnes, 'It's Just a
Quarrel':Some States Offer No Domestic Violence Protectionto Gays, 84 A.B.A. J.24,
24 (February 1998) (referring to a "Catch-22" for GLBT victims of same-sex domestic
violence who may risk criminal prosecution under state sodomy laws by reporting
incidents of abuse).
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A handful of jurisdictions have made domestic violence protection
clearly available to victims of same-sex domestic violence.5 9 Of the
states in this group, only Hawaii specifically includes same-sex
relationship victims in the sweep of its domestic violence protection via
statutory language. 60 The Hawaii statute affords protection to spouses or
"reciprocal beneficiaries" of the abuser.
The phrase "reciprocal
beneficiaries" is a term of art that describes the status of same-sex
partners who take certain legal steps.61
Other states have affirmatively extended domestic violence
protection to GLBT individuals through statutory interpretation.62 In its
2001 state-by-state analysis, the NCAVP reported that courts in Illinois,63
Kentucky, 64 New Jersey, 65 Ohio, 66 and Pennsylvania 67 have interpreted
59. 2001 REPORT, supra note 13, at 16-17. NCAVP includes Hawaii, Illinois,
Kentucky, New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania in its "affirmatively available" category.

Id.
60.

HAW. REV.

STAT. ANN.

§ 586-1(2)

(Michie, WESTLAW

through 2003

legislation). The statute protects "family or household members" of the abuser and
defines those terms to mean "spouses or reciprocal beneficiaries, former spouses or
former reciprocal beneficiaries, persons who have a child in common, parents, children,
persons related by consanguinity, persons jointly residing or formerly residing in the
same dwelling unit, and persons who have or have had a dating relationship." Id.
61. In creating the reciprocal beneficiary legal status, the Hawaii legislature
acknowledged that "there are many individuals who have significant personal, emotional,
and economic relationships with another individual yet are prohibited by such legal
restrictions from marrying. For example ... two individuals who are of the same gender.
Therefore, the legislature believes that certain rights and benefits presently available only
to married couples should be made available to couples comprised of two individuals
who are legally prohibited from marrying one another." HAW. REV.STAT. ANN. § 572C-2
(Michie, WESTLAW through 2003 legislation).
62. 2001 REPORT, supra note 13, at 16-17.
63. In 1993, the First District, Fourth Division of the Appellate Court of Illinois
affirmed a trial court's granting of a protective order filed by one man against another.
Glater v. Fabianich, 625 N.E.2d 96 (Il. App. Ct. 1993). A lower court granted a plenary
order of protection based on several witnesses' oral testimony regarding the nature of the
relationship between the two men. Id. at 98. The court reasoned that the purpose of the
state's Domestic Violence Act ("the Act") was to prevent abuse between family and
household members. Id. at 99. The court also rejected the respondent's argument that
the Act applied only to persons related by marriage and blood, finding that the Act was
"designed to prevent abuse between persons sharing intimate relationships," including a
relationship between two men. Id.
64. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky determined that state legal protection is
equally available to victims of domestic violence stemming from both opposite-sex and
same-sex relationships. Ireland v. Davis, 957 S.W.2d 310 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997). The
lower court dismissed a domestic violence proceeding between two men in an intimate
relationship, reasoning that same-sex couples had other protective remedies such as
criminal complaints and restraining orders. Id. at 312. Reversing the lower court's
decision, the Kentucky Court of Appeals pointed out that to exclude gay and lesbian
couples on that basis would deny them the same protection from domestic violence
available to heterosexual couples. Id. The court ultimately concluded that Kentucky's
domestic violence statutes "afford protection to same-sex couples just as they do to the
others enumerated therein. The General Assembly has not given preferential treatment to
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their respective gender-neutral statutes to specifically include gay and
lesbian victims of domestic violence.68
In October of 2003, Florida became the most recent state to
affirmatively protect GLBT victims of domestic violence. In Peterman
v. Meeker,69 the Second District of the Court of Appeal of Florida
concluded that its state domestic violence law equally protects victims of
both opposite-sex and same-sex domestic violence. 70 The court pointed
out that subpart (1)(e) in section 741.30 of the Florida Code stated: "No

same-sex couples or homosexuals; rather, it has provided for equal treatment under the
law for same-sex or homosexual victims of domestic violence." Id.
65. In 2001, the Chancery Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey determined
whether it had jurisdiction to issue a protective order filed by a stepdaughter against her
stepmother. Storch v. Sauerhoff, 757 A.2d 836 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). The
defendant/stepmother claimed that she was neither a family member nor a member of
petitioner's household under the scope of New Jersey's Domestic Violence Act of 1991
("the Act"). Id. at 837. The court disagreed and reasoned that when the state legislature
amended the Act by replacing the word "cohabitant" with "household member," it
intended to expand the scope of the Act's coverage. Id. at 839. The court claimed proper
jurisdiction and noted that "[w]hile the prior law required that victims be cohabitants of
opposite sex, or, if not of the opposite sex, related by blood, the current Act protects
unrelated, same sex persons living together .... Id.
66. The Court of Appeals of Ohio heard an appeal from the State of Ohio seeking to
reverse municipal court's decision to dismiss a domestic violence charge against a
lesbian. State v. Hadinger, 573 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). The Franklin County
Municipal Court dismissed the charge based upon its determination that under Ohio's
domestic violence law, two women could not be married and therefore could not be
living in a "spousal relationship." Id. at 1191. Not wanting to "eviscerate the efforts of
the legislature to safeguard, regardless of gender, the rights of victims of domestic
violence," the court held that the domestic violence law, which defined a "person living
as a spouse" as a person "who otherwise is cohabiting with the offender," included two
persons of the same sex. Id. at 1193. See also State v. Linner, 665 N.E.2d 1180 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1996); State v. Yaden, 692 N.E.2d 1097 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) ("It is true that
same-sex couples are not permitted to be 'spouses' of each other. But the definition of
'living as a spouse' includes a larger segment of couples-not only 'spouses' but also
'cohabitors.' Opposite-sex couples who 'cohabit' are protected. We can see no tangible
benefit to withholding [domestic violence] protection from same-sex couples."); In re
Bicknell, Nos. CA2000-07-140, CA2000-07-141, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 650, at *26-30
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001), rev'don other grounds, 771 N.E.2d 846 (Ohio 2002).
67. In 1999, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania concluded that a man had proper
standing to file a petition for a protection order against his former male lover. D.H. v.
B.O., 734 A.2d 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999). In his petition, the appellee "referred to
appellant as his former roommate and homosexual lover" and the Pennsylvania Superior
Court found enough evidence existed for the two men to meet the intimate relationship
requirement to trigger potential coverage under Pennsylvania's domestic violence law.
Id. at 410. Despite the appellee's proper standing, the court concluded that there was
insufficient evidence to justify the entry of a Protection From Abuse order. Id.
68. 2001 REPORT, supra note 13, at 16-17.
69. 855 So.2d 690 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
70. Id. at 690. The appellant argued that same-sex couples did not qualify as
"persons residing together as if a family" because same-sex couples are barred from
marriage in Florida. Id.

1264

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 109:4

person shall be precluded from seeking injunctive relief pursuant to this7
chapter solely on the basis that such a person is not a spouse.", '
Accordingly, the court held that the state domestic violence law did not
exclude victims of same-sex domestic violence.72
C. The Effect of Bowers v. Hardwick and State Anti-Sodomy Laws on
Same-Sex Domestic Violence
In 1986, the GLBT community was faced with a formidable
obstacle to accessing equal rights and protections following the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.7 3 In Bowers,
the Court confronted the issue of "whether the Federal Constitution
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and
hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such
conduct illegal ....

By narrowly framing the constitutional issue in Bowers, the Court
found that a Georgia anti-sodomy statute was constitutional.75 It rejected
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Constitution conferred a right
of privacy extending to intimate acts such as sodomy.7 6 The Court
reasoned that "no connection between family, marriage, or procreation
on the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated. 7 7 Finally, the Court held that the state's belief that
homosexual sodomy is immoral is a legitimate basis for the law and the
statute therefore passed rational-basis scrutiny. 78

71. Id.
72. Id. The court also acknowledged that other jurisdictions have concluded that
individuals in same-sex relationships were eligible for protection under state domestic
violence statutes, citing judicial decisions in Illinois, Kentucky, and Ohio. Id.
73. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
74. Id. at 190.
75. In his dissenting opinion in Bowers, Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's
characterization of the case and argued that "[t]his case is no more about a 'fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy,' as the Court purports to declare, ante, at 2844,
than Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), was about a fundamental right to watch
obscene movies, or Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), was about a fundamental
right to place interstate bets from a telephone booth. Rather, this case is about 'the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,' namely, 'the right to
be let alone."' Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928)).
76. The majority provided a history of sodomy laws within the United States to
counter the argument that a right to sodomy has been valued in America. Bowers, 478
U.S. at 192-94. The Court refused to "discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the
Due Process Clause" and rejected the argument that there is not a right to engage in
sodomy within the home because no textual support for such a right existed in the
Constitution. Id. at 194-195.
77. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
78. Id. at 196.
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The Bowers decision functioned to exclusively link the stigmatized
conduct of sodomy with gay and lesbian individuals. By advocating
such a narrow view of an entire class of people, "the Court dehumanized
and depersonalized gay men and
lesbians by removing all other aspects
79
of personal and social identity.,
In Padula v. Webster,8° one federal circuit court followed the
Bowers Court's lead by defining gay and lesbian individuals primarily by
their stigmatized intimate acts. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia rejected a woman's claim that the Federal
Bureau of Investigation unconstitutionally discriminated against her
when it failed to offer her a position due to her sexual orientation. 81 The
court concluded that "it would be quite anomalous, on its face, to declare
status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally criminalize as
deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause.82
Sodomy statutes affect important aspects of the lives of the GLBT
community.83 The existence of sodomy laws encouraged violence and
harassment towards the homosexuality community, supported
discrimination in employment cases, prevented equal treatment in family
and custody matters, undermined the growth of pro-gay rights
organizations, and fostered discrimination in immigration cases. 84 As
recently as the year 2000, officials and legislators in states including
Arizona,85 Arkansas,8 6 and Missouri87 actively worked to keep the
79. See Todd M. Hughes, Symposium: Towards a Radical and PluralDemocracy:
Making Romer Work, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 169, 171 (1997). See also Carlos A. Ball, The

Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1211-15 (May 2004) (addressing the Bowers
Court's narrow view of gay and lesbian relationships in contrast to the view adopted by
the Lawrence Court).
80. 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
81. Id. at 102-04.
82. Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
83. See generally Gary D. Allison, Sanctioning Sodomy: The Supreme Court
Liberates Gay Sex and Limits State power to Vindicate the Moral Sentiments of the
People, 39 TULSA L. REV. 95, 109-41 (providing a extensive review of the history of
sodomy laws in the United States and their impact on the lives and rights of GLBT
individuals).
84. See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by
"Unenforced" Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 103 (2000). See also Allison,
supra note 83, at 109-41.
85. PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION, HOSTILE CLIMATE 2000: REPORT
ON ANTI-GAY ACTIVITY 80 (2000). The People for the American Way Foundation
reported that right-wing legislators in Arizona strategically blocked the repeal of the
state's anti-sodomy statute. On a day an openly gay legislator and key supporter of the
repeal was absent, Republican House Speaker Jeff Grocost used parliamentary
maneuvers to kill the repeal. Id.
86. Id. at 86. On multiple occasions, Arkansas' attorney general and other state
prosecutors moved to dismiss a lawsuit filed by seven gay and lesbian plaintiffs to
challenge the state's sodomy law, which was passed in 1977. The Arkansas state courts
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discriminatory anti-sodomy laws in effect.
In the area of domestic violence law, sodomy laws have negatively
impacted the availability of protection for victims of same-sex domestic
violence. One of the most significant issues in same-sex domestic
violence is that the abuser can maintain control over the victim by
threatening to "out" him/her. 88 In a jurisdiction that had an anti-sodomy
law, a victim's fear of being "outed" and having his or her sexual
orientation revealed was further compounded by the threat of being
criminalized as a result of his or her intimate acts. s9 Thus, isolation
experienced by victims of domestic violence was felt even more acutely
by victims in homosexual relationships.9"
Although the sodomy laws may not have been regularly enforced,
consensual homosexual sodomy convictions still occurred, and the
accompanying criminal stigma continued to be a reality. 91 A victim of
same-sex domestic violence would be reluctant to report abuse because
of the negative implications that may result from revealing their sexual
orientation and being subject to arrest and criminal prosecution.9 2 Even
if a state no longer enforced its anti-sodomy statute, the statute's
existence sent a clear message to GLBT
individuals that they were
93
criminals within that state's legal system.
As discussed in Section II.A, a unique issue in same-sex domestic
ultimately denied these motions. Id.
87. Id. at 221. In August of 2000, Missouri State Attorney General Jay Nixon
requested a clarification of a ruling issued by a state court. One month earlier, a state
court of appeals overturned a man's sexual misconduct conviction because the man's
partner consented to the sex at issue. The Missouri sexual misconduct statute prohibited
sodomy without a person's consent. Attorney General Nixon asked the court to rule that
the "consent" provision of the statute was inapplicable to homosexual sexual acts. Id.
88. 2002 REPORT, supra note 10, at 9. See also generally Elliott, supra note 19.
89. 2002 REPORT, supra note 11, at 18 (reporting that at the time of the Lawrence v.
Texas decision, criminal sodomy statutes remained in thirteen states). See also Patricia
G. Barnes, supra note 58, at 24.
90. Rosemary Barnes, supra note 2, at 24. Sandra Moore-Pope, a clinical social
worker, explained that "Domestic violence is a process that starts gradually and gets more
severe as time goes by. At some point in the process, the stronger partner begins
isolating the weaker one. The stronger partner takes advantage of the victim's fear of
being outed. They'll threaten to tell their boss, their parents. They harp on about how the
police and other mainstream groups will discriminate against them. Severe isolation is a
huge problem for abused gays and lesbians. Early intervention is so critical." Id.
91. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF
THE CLOSET 374-376 (1999). See generally Leslie, supra note 84 (discussing the harmful
effects of enforced and unenforced state anti-sodomy statutes and the criminal stigma
created by such laws).
92. See, e.g. Patricia G. Barnes, supra note 58, at 24; 2002 REPORT, supra note 10, at
19.
93. Krisana M. Hodges, Comment, Trouble In Paradise: Barriers to Addressing
Domestic Violence in Lesbian Relationships, 9 TUL. J. L. & SEXUALITY 311, 324 (19992000).
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violence is that the abuser may perpetuate and encourage the internalized
homophobia within his or her victim, thereby increasing control and
isolation of the victim. 94 Sodomy laws linked the sexual expression of
gay and lesbian individuals with negative criminal connotations and
contributed to the self-hatred and shame of individuals in those
relationships.9 5
In an article focusing on the negative impact of anti-sodomy laws,
Christopher Leslie explained that sodomy laws contribute to internalized
homophobia within GLBT individuals, "including denial of membership
in the group, self-derision, self-hatred, hatred of others in the group, and
acting out self-fulfilling prophesies about one's own inferiority. 9 6
Sodomy laws acted as a weapon for the abuser because they underscored
the disparate power dynamic between abuser and victim, a key factor in
abusive relationships.97
Sodomy laws directly affected the legal remedies available to the
victims of same-sex domestic violence and the resources available to
them. For example, in 1998, North Carolina Republican Representative
Russell Capps tried to utilize the state's anti-sodomy statute to exclude
same-sex domestic violence victims from protection under the state's
Crime Victims Rights Amendment.98 Representative Capps argued,
"This doesn't take away anyone's rights. It simply keeps us from adding
a benefit to a group violating the law." 99 North Carolina's domestic
violence law also made victims of same-sex domestic violence
susceptible to criminal prosecution under the state anti-sodomy statute.100
The increased social and criminal stigma associated with the gay
community following the Bowers decision also played a part in the
treatment of victims of same-sex domestic violence by law enforcement
officials and domestic violence workers. The NCAVP compiled incident
reports from several regions in the country and found that many police
officers responding to same-sex domestic violence situations continued
to express homophobia. 10 1 The reports indicated that domestic violence
shelter workers often possessed homophobic attitudes towards same-sex
domestic violence victims and many shelter employees lacked the

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

2002 REPORT, supra note 10, at 9-10.
See generally Leslie, supra note 84, at 116-21.
Id. at 117.
2002 REPORT, supra note 10, at 5-7, 11.
Joseph Neff, Panel Backs Victims' Rights in Domestic Violence, THE NEWS AND
OBSERVER, July 1, 1998, at A3.
99. Id.
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50B-1, 50B-8 (LEXIS through 2003 legislation). See
discussion supra, Part II.C.
101. 2002 REPORT, supra note 10, at 14-15.
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02
sensitivity and training to help those individuals.1
Victims of same-sex domestic violence have faced many obstacles
on the path to equal access to legal protection and resources. These
victims have encountered either restrictive or ambiguous state domestic
violence statutes and/or homophobic attitudes from law enforcement,
media, courts, and shelter workers. Further compounding the inadequate
treatment provided to these victims was the Bowers decision, which
validated stigmatizing state anti-sodomy laws and reinforced society's
negative attitudes toward and treatment of the GLBT community at
large.

III.
A.

Analysis
Lawrence v. Texas: A Victory for the Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and
TransgenderedCommunity

On June 26, 2003, the United States Supreme Court handed down a
landmark decision that significantly impacted the lives of GLBT
individuals throughout the United States. In Lawrence v. Texas,1 03 the
Court held that a Texas statute criminalizing same-sex sodomy violated
the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
104
States Constitution.

Writing for the majority in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy recognized
that sodomy laws have "far reaching consequences, touching upon the
most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of
places, the home."'' 0 5 The Court reasoned that the government cannot be
allowed to "demean" the "existence or control" of the lives of GLBT
10 6
individuals by criminalizing their private, consensual, sexual conduct.
Relying upon prior cases establishing the constitutional right to privacy
in the home and autonomy of personal relationships,' 0 7 the Court
acknowledged the Constitutional right of two adults to engage in
consensual sexual practices common to homosexual partners without

102. Id. at 17. Based on a review of incident reports and surveys of domestic
violence programs, the NCAVP concluded that the denial of services to gay and lesbian
victims occurred in many ways. Some programs had an express exclusionary statement
regarding same-sex domestic violence victims, while other programs failed to prioritize
the issue and properly train their staffs regarding homophobia and special issues within
same-sex intimate relationships. Id.
103. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
104. Id. at 577-79.
105. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
106. Id. at 578.
107. Id. at 564-67.
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government intervention.10 8 The petitioners, like all GLBT individuals,
were "entitled to respect for their private lives. '10 9
It is significant, however, that the Court went beyond the
recognition of GLBT individuals' freedom of consensual sexual conduct.
The Lawrence majority also made the connection between the sexual
conduct at issue and the personal relationships complementing that
conduct. 10 The Court noted that "[f]reedom extend[ed] beyond spatial
bounds""'1 and concluded that "[1]iberty presumes an autonomy of self
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct." ' 12
Thus, the Court reasoned that sexual conduct and
expression, limited by sodomy
laws, is just "one element in a personal
13
enduring."
more
is
that
bond
In reaching its decision, the Lawrence Court necessarily overruled
Bowers v. Hardwick.114 The Lawrence majority criticized the narrowly
framed constitutional issue upon which the Bowers decision was based.
Justice Kennedy reasoned that to conclude the issue in Bowers was
solely about the right to engage in sodomy "demeans the claim the
individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it
' 15
said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse."
The Lawrence Court also recognized the failure of the Bowers
decision to appreciate the negative implications the decision would have
on the lives of so many individuals." 16 In assessing the Texas antisodomy statute at issue in the Lawrence case, the majority acknowledged
the far-reaching, dire consequences to those convicted under state anti1 7
sodomy statutes.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 578.
Id.

See Ball, supra note 79, at 1212-13 ("The Lawrence Court recognized that
criminalization of particular kinds of sexual intimacy not only limits the autonomy of
individuals to decide which kinds of sexual acts they want to engage in and with whom; it
also, directly and necessarily, has an impact on the autonomy of individuals to build
relationships that are based, in part, upon that sexual intimacy.").
11. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 567.
114. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See Allison, supra note 83, at 141-50 (discussing the
justification and reasoning behind the Lawrence Court's overruling of the Bowers
decision).

115. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
116. Id. "The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that purport
to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and purposes, though,
have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct,
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The statutes do seek to
control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the
law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals." Id.
117. Id. at 574-76. "The stignma the Texas criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not
trivial. The offense, to be sure. is but a class C misdemeanor, a minor offense in the
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The Lawrence decision effectively signaled an end to state antisodomy laws nationwide. 18 To do so, the Lawrence majority recognized
that Bowers v. Hardwick was largely based on the premise that history
and tradition have supported the condemnation of homosexuality as
immoral." 9 The Court then answered in the negative the question of
"whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these
20
views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law."'
Consequently, the majority concluded that the Texas anti-sodomy statute
at issue "furthered no legitimate state interest which can
justify its
12
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual., 1
A post-Lawrence Eleventh Circuit case demonstrated the
acknowledgment of at least one state that its anti-sodomy statute no
longer passed constitutional muster.122 In a lawsuit challenging an
Alabama anti-sodomy statute, the court ultimately found that the
plaintiffs lacked standing, but it recognized that Lawrence v. Texas
rendered
statutory
prohibitions
on
consensual
sodomy
unconstitutional.1 23 The court noted that Alabama's Attorney General
conceded in his supplemental brief that the Lawrence decision nullified
the state's anti-sodomy statute because
it applied to private, consensual
24
persons.
unmarried
sodomy between
By overruling Bowers and recognizing the constitutional privacy
right of homosexuals to engage in private, consensual acts, the Lawrence
decision was a tremendous step forward for the GLBT community.
However, while Lawrence v. Texas voided the remaining state antisodomy statutes, 25 "it is less clear how the decision will affect hotTexas legal system. Still, it remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the
dignity of the persons charged. The petitioners will bear on their record the history of
their criminal convictions." Id. at 575.
118. At the time of the Lawrence decision, the following states had criminal antisodomy statutes: Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. 2002 REPORT,
supra note 10, at 19.
119. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
120. Id. The Court subsequently quoted from its decision in Planned Parenthood v.

Casey: "Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code." 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
121. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
122. Doe v. Pryor, 344 F.3d 1282 (2003). ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a)(3) criminalizes
deviate sexual intercourse as defined by ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(2) (WESTLAW through
2004 legislation).
123. Doe, 344 F.3d at 1287.
124. Id. at 1287.
125. But see Chris Bull, The Lawrence Legacy, THE ADVOCATE, January 20, 2004, at

38. Mr. Bull reported that four months after the Lawrence decision, a Virginia Beach,
Virginia judge allowed state prosecutors to proceed with sodomy charges against a
homosexual man. Pat Logue, interim legal director of Lambda Legal Defense and

Education Fund, explained that despite the tremendous victory for the GLBT community
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button issues such as same-sex marriage, the Pentagon's 'don't ask, don't
tell' policy, and family law."' 126 Just how far the consequences of127the
Lawrence decision will reach has become a highly-debated question.
B.

The Effect of the Nullification of State Anti-Sodomy Laws on Victims
of Same-Sex Domestic Violence

In the aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, the media and legal
commentators have primarily focused on the decision's implications for
controversial issues in gay rights politics, particularly same-sex
marriage.28 The decision will also be felt, however, in the area of samesex domestic violence.
By invalidating state anti-sodomy laws,
Lawrence will have both direct and indirect effects on same-sex domestic
violence.
The Lawrence decision directly affected North Carolina domestic
violence law. 129 As referenced in Part II.B and II.C of this comment, a
victim of same-sex domestic violence faced prosecution under North
Carolina's sodomy law, a threat specifically referenced in the domestic
violence protection statute. 130 Without this threat attached to the process
of securing civil protection from their abusers, GLBT victims of
domestic violence in North Carolina will now be more likely to seek
legal remedies.
Although North Carolina is the only state whose domestic violence
law is directly linked to an anti-sodomy statute, the removal of antisodomy statutes positively affects state legal remedies for victims of
same-sex domestic violence in all states. Sodomy laws stigmatized not
only the GLBT community at large, but also functioned as an obstacle to
victims of same-sex domestic violence in their quest to obtain legal
protection from abuse.
In its brief in support of Johnny Baxley, the appellee who
challenged his conviction under Louisiana's anti-sodomy statute, the
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. ("Lambda") explained
following Lawrence, "[tihere are definitely a few rogue cases out there. There's a
reluctance to accept what Lawrence really means about equality and a desire to keep
going after gay people. These are the last gasps of legal resistance to equality." Id.
126. Id. at 38.
127. Id. at 38. In Mr. Bull's article, David Garrow, author of LIBERTY AND
SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE, remarked on the
state of flux of gay rights following the decision: "What is going to be the analytical and
interpretive impact of Lawrence? How broadly will it be interpreted? It is limited to
sodomy statutes or more sweeping in its effect? It's going to take some time to sort this
all out." Id.
128. Id.
129. 2002 REPORT, supra note 10, at 19.
130. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50B-l, 50B-8 (WESTLAW through 2004 legislation).
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how sodomy laws perpetuated violence towards and hatred of
homosexuals. 13 ' Lambda reasoned that state sodomy laws "penalize
specific forms of sexual expression, or that come to be used or
understood as branding a particular group of outlaws, convey a message
of social disapproval to all citizens.' ' 132 Lambda added that the laws
"reinforce individual hostility against people who practice (or who are
deemed to practice) such behaviors, or who are inaccurately held 'to
be
33
law."'
the
by
proscribed
ostensibly
conduct'
the
by
defined
class
'the
In 2001 and 2002, the NCAVP reported that many victims of samesex domestic violence faced criminal prosecution under a state antisodomy statute, and also faced criminal and social stigma associated with
same-sex intimacy.1 34 As long as sodomy laws remained in effect,
"many individuals in same-sex relationships are considered criminals
under their state sodomy law. They do not call 911 out of fear that the
1' 35
police will not be responsive, that they will be dismissive, or worse."
Because Lawrence effectively overruled existent state anti-sodomy
statutes and underscored the legitimacy of same-sex intimacy, the
decision helps combat the special issues confronted by victims of samesex domestic violence.
Without anti-sodomy laws, individuals abused by their same-sex
partners will no longer face criminal prosecution inherent in the
admission of involvement in an intimate same-sex relationship.
Furthermore, the stigma associated with sodomy will decrease as the
laws are nullified, prosecutions cease, and the Court's recognition of the
freedom and dignity of sexual intimacy between adults, heterosexual and
36
homosexual, sinks into the consciousness of American society.
Victims of same-sex domestic violence will be more likely to publicly
acknowledge their relationships and to report abuse.
Anti-sodomy laws have contributed to other special issues faced by
abuse victims in homosexual relationships. The stigma associated with
sodomy laws furthered discrimination and homophobia towards the
GLBT generally.' 37
Consequently, victims of same-sex domestic
violence contended with the negative implications of being "outed" by

131. Brief of Amici Curiae Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.,
Louisiana v. Baxley, 633 So.2d 142 (La. 1994).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See generally 2001 REPORT supra note 13; 2002 REPORT, supra note 10.
135. See Knauer, supra note 10, at 348.
136. See Allison, supra note 83, at 129-40 (discussing the positive strides made by the
GLBT community in recent years vis-A-vis advancements in the portrayal of GLBT
individuals, increased political presence, greater religious acceptance and invalidation of
sodomy laws).
137. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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their abusive partners. 138 These individuals also faced homophobic
attitudes and responses by law enforcement officers, abuse shelter
workers, and the court system. 139 Harassment and discrimination by
police and shelter workers will no longer be tolerated as the recognition,
respect, and education regarding the GLBT community increase over
time.In4
The principles set forth in the Lawrence decision underscore the
progress that the GLBT community has made in seeking respect, dignity,
and recognition within our country. 14' The backlash following the
decision only highlights the fact that Lawrence v. Texas represents
increased approval 4(or
at least greater tolerance) of GLBT individuals
2
1
country.
our
within
C. Lawrence: Paving the Way for Same-Sex Marriageand GLBT
Individuals' Equal Access to Domestic Violence Laws
Lawrence v. Texas recognized the privacy right of adult individuals
to engage in consensual, sexual conduct within the privacy of their
homes. 143 And, generally, domestic violence laws center upon the
private nature of the crime. 44 Thus, "[flor same-sex couples to gain the
same protections,
they must first assert the private nature of their
145
relationship."
The Lawrence decision represented a tremendous step for the GLBT
community in claiming an important right stemming from their private,
intimate relationships. The Lawrence Court recognized the connection
between the sexual conduct at issue and the personal relationships
accompanying that conduct. 146 The Court concluded that sexual conduct
and expression, limited by sodomy laws, is just "one element in a

138.

See discussion supra Parts II.A.

139.
140.

See generally 2001 REPORT, supranote 13; 2002 REPORT, supra note 10.
See Allison, supra note 83, at 129-40.

141. Dissenting in Lawrence, Justice Scalia acknowledged this trend and expressed
his disdain that "[t]oday's opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a
law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by
which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating
the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct." Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 602.
142. See Associated Press, Polls Hint at Backlash After Gay-Rights Ruling, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, July 30, 2003, at 10.
143. See discussion, supra Part III.A.

144. Knauer, supra note 10, at 339.
145. Id. at 340.
146. See, e.g., Ball, supra note 79, at 1212 ("The Court in Lawrence understood that
the Texas sodomy statute implicated liberty interests associated with personal
relationships as much as liberty interests associated with sexual conduct.").
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personal bond that is more enduring."' 147 Therefore, by extending privacy
protection to the sexual conduct of GLBT individuals and the personal
relationships in which they engage in such conduct, the Lawrence
decision constituted an important progression by including GLBT
individuals within the ambit of domestic violence laws.
Specifically, the growing reality of same-sex marriage following the
Lawrence v. Texas decision represents an indirect way in which
Lawrence will impact same-sex domestic violence. 148 If states use the
Lawrence decision to lay the constitutional foundation for same-sex
marriages, the civil and criminal protections available to individuals as
spouses, including domestic violence protections, will likewise be readily
available to members of the GLBT community.
In his dissenting opinion in the Lawrence case, Justice Scalia
recognized that the rationale and principles underlying Lawrence v.
Texas "leave[] on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples." 149 Although Arizona1 50 and Indiana 151 recently
barred the extension of marriage rights to homosexual couples following
the Lawrence decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Court opened the
door to the existence of same-sex marriage.
In Goodridge v. Dep 't of Pub. Health,'52 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts analyzed whether the Commonwealth's denial of civil
marriage to homosexual couples was consistent with the principles in the
147.
148.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
See generally Ball, supra note 79 (providing a thorough analysis of the Due

Process implications of Lawrence decision in the context of affirmative government
recognition of same-sex marriage).
149. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601.
150. Standhardt v. Arizona, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). In Standhardt,
petitioners argued that the Lawrence decision "implicitly recognized" that the
fundamental right to marry includes the freedom to choose a same-sex partner. Id. at
456. The court rejected this argument, pointing to explicit language in Lawrence that the
decision "[did] not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 578 (2003)). The court also reasoned that "because other language in
Lawrence indicates that the Court did not consider sexual conduct between same-sex
partners a fundamental right, it would be illogical to interpret the quoted language as
recognizing a fundamental right to enter a same-sex marriage." Id. at 457. Ultimately,
the court rejected any fundamental due process right to marry a same-sex partner and
determined that "it is for the people of Arizona, through their elected representatives or
by using the initiative process, rather than this court, to decide whether to permit samesex marriages." Id. at 465.
151. Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that Indiana's
Defense of Marriage Act did not violate the state constitution because the state had a
legitimate interest in encouraging opposite-sex couples to enter into and remain in the
stable institution of marriage for the sake of children who are frequently the natural result
of sexual relations between a man and the state's constitution did not require the
government to act affirmatively in extending benefits of marriage to same-sex couples).
152. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass.2003).
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Massachusetts Constitution. 153 The suit arose when fourteen individuals
(seven same-sex couples) were denied marriage licenses from their local
an administrative step
clerk's offices, preventing them from taking
154
necessary for marriage in the Commonwealth.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized that
marriage is a "vital social institution."'1 55 It further acknowledged that
when same-sex couples are denied marriage, those individuals are
"arbitrarily deprived of membership in one of community's most
rewarding and cherished institutions" and "barred access to the
protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage.... 15 6 Following
an analysis of the nature of marriage itself and the guarantees of liberty
within the Massachusetts Constitution, the court concluded that the
violation of
Commonwealth's ban on marriage was an unconstitutional
157
the rights of GLBT individuals seeking marriage.
The Lawrence decision, handed down only five months earlier,
played an important role in this landmark Massachusetts decision.
Although the Massachusetts court noted that Lawrence did not
specifically address same-sex marriage, it acknowledged that Lawrence
stood for the concept that government is prohibited from intruding "into
the deeply personal realms of consensual adult expressions of intimacy
and one's choice of an intimate partner." 158 As is the case with many
state constitutions, the court concluded that the Massachusetts
Constitution is "more protective of individual and equality" than the
less government interference with
federal Constitution and tolerates even
"protected spheres of private life.' 59
The Goodridge case exemplified the way that the post-Lawrence
153. Id. at 948. The plaintiffs argued that denial of same-sex marriage violated
Articles 1, 6, 7, 10, 12 and 16 and Part II, Clause 1, Section 1, Article 4 of the
Massachusetts Constitution. Id. at 950.
154. Id. at 950. The Department of Public Health, the named defendant in this
lawsuit, is commanded by state statute to safeguard public health, including overseeing
the Commonwealth's vital records relative to the issuance of marriage licenses. Id. at
949.
155. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.
156. Id. at 949.
157. Id. at 968. The Goodridge majority discussed the numerous benefits attached to
marriage, granting "enormous private and social advantages" to married individuals and
their families. Id. at 954-57. In light of these benefits, the court recognized that marriage
has been conceptualized as a "civil fight" on both the federal and state level and that laws
should protect this right from government intrusion. Id. at 957. Reflecting on prior
federal and state court decisions addressing the right of marriage, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts concluded that the Commonwealth's ban on same-sex marriage
"deprives individuals of access to an institution of fundamental legal, personal, and social
significance" solely because one's sexual orientation. Id. at 958.
158. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.
159. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948-49.
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path to same-sex marriages in the states will yield positive results for
victims of same-sex domestic violence. Throughout its opinion, the
Goodridge court repeatedly noted the way in which marriage bestows
numerous legal, social, and civil benefits upon individuals. 60 Upon
entering into marriage, an individual immediately gains access to
important rights such as financial, tax, medical, insurance, and
inheritance benefits. 161 In other words, being a "spouse" has enormous
advantages.
One crucial benefit stemming from being a married individual is
reflected in domestic violence statutes. In each and every state that
makes protection either unavailable or only neutrally available to abuse
victims in same-sex relationships, the domestic violence statutes clearly
afford protection to "spouses.' ' 162
In these states, abused GLBT
individuals are either excluded from protection access because of narrow
statutory definitions, or they must hope state courts liberally construe the
neutrally worded statutes to include them within the scope of protection.
If other states follow Massachusetts' path in the wake of the
Lawrence decision, ambiguity will no longer be an obstacle. Given the
opportunity to enter into marriages, many GLBT individuals will choose
to have the same benefits and advantages traditionally provided to
married heterosexuals. Victims of abuse in same-sex relationships will
finally have the unequivocal protection of state domestic violence laws.
IV.

Conclusion

Domestic violence in same-sex relationships is a national problem.
Incident reports and statistics gathered by the NCAVP and other
domestic violence institutions reveal that same-sex domestic violence
occurs at the same frequency as heterosexual domestic violence. Clearly,
the power dynamics and patterns of abuse in domestic violence transcend
sexual orientation.
160. "[M]arriage provides an abundance of legal, financial, and social benefits."
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948. "Barred access to the protections, benefits, and
obligations of civil marriage .. " Id. at 949. "[Dlenying marriage licenses to the
plaintiffs was tantamount to denying them access to civil marriage itself, with its
appurtenant social and legal protections, benefits, and obligations."
Id. at 950.
"[Marriage] is central to the way the Commonwealth identifies individuals, provides for

the orderly distribution of property, ensures that children and adults are cared for and
supported whenever possible from private rather than public funds, and tracks important
epidemiological and demographic data." Id. at 954. "Marriage also bestows enormous
private and social advantages on those who choose to marry." Id. "Tangible as well as
intangible benefits flow from marriage." Id. at 955. "The benefits accessible only by
way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and death."

Id.
161.
162.

Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955-57.
See discussion supra Part II.B and accompanying footnotes.
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Despite this evidence, law enforcement officials, courts, legislators,
and domestic violence shelters have been slow to recognize and treat the
problem. Although the GLBT community has made tremendous strides
in attaining visibility, respect, and rights over the past few decades,
domestic violence law continues to be an area in dire need of
improvement.
The Lawrence v. Texas decision is an important victory for the gay
community. The United States Supreme Court acknowledged the respect
between and privacy rights of consenting adults to engage in private
sexual intimacies. By reversing Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court rid the
nation of archaic and stigmatizing anti-sodomy laws whose only purpose
was to dehumanize and target GLBT citizens.
In the wake of Lawrence, our nation has focused on the decision's
implications for the controversial issue of same-sex marriage. Domestic
violence law, however, represents another area of the law that will be
positively affected by that landmark decision. By overruling state antisodomy laws, promoting privacy rights and respect of GLBT individuals,
and paving the way for spousal benefits via same-sex marriage,
Lawrence v. Texas is a significant triumph for victims of same-sex
domestic violence across the country.

